Local fishery, global commodity: the role of institutions in mediating intersectoral conflict, cooperation, and competition in a globalized fishery

One of the trends leading to conflicts are the disparities between industrial and small-scale fishers' 'action resources' that create divergent incentives. Ratner et al (2013) describe action resources as 'those intangible and tangible assets that give actors the capability for agency' (p. 193). Assets provide the basis for choices; the more assets one has (e.g. education, wealth, time), the more choices perceived between conflict or cooperation. These assets are also more than the sum of their parts, and constitute the resource user's livelihood strategy (Allison and Ellis 2001, LeBillon 2001, Stonich and Vandergeest 2001, Campling et al 2012).

In Ghana, these sectoral differences are dramatic. Small-scale fishers often have limited financial capital, nets and boats are financed through credit, and frequently represent a large proportion of the owner's personal wealth (box 2: A, B). There is no insurance scheme in the small-scale fishery, so losses are incurred solely by the net or vessel owner. Ghanaian small-scale fishers also have limited access to alternative livelihoods, so loss of capital may mean temporary or permanent loss of employment and income (Finegold et al 2010, box 2: C and D). In contrast, the capital and operations of industrial fishing are predominantly funded by fishing companies, large entities owned by multiple stakeholders not present during an interaction at sea. Industrial vessels are insured, reducing the likelihood that loss or damage are incurred by the fishers themselves. The two sectors have dramatically different technological assets, with small-scale vessels comprised of dugout or planked canoes, operating by paddle, sail, or small outboard motor, and industrial vessels utilizing inboard engines and hydraulic technologies (Atta-Mills et al 2004, Finegold et al 2010). Industrial actors also display a number of intangible assets that improve their relative agency. Since industrial vessels frequently hold licenses to fish in neighboring countries, and because they are provisioned for longer trips of greater distances, they have greater assets of time and mobility than small-scale actors, who are bound to shore for food and fuel (box 2: E). In some cases, these assets enable industrial actors to avoid local ports and land-based authorities, requiring small-scale actors to settle for the—potentially insufficient—compensation negotiated at sea (box 2: F and G).

These configurations of 'action resources' are a product of their historical development and the very different markets and patterns of accumulation between sectors. As foreign-owned, export-oriented vessels, industrial actors are part of a globalized 'accumulation regime' that separates labor from capital, integrates it into a mechanized means of production, with insurance protecting actors from loss (Peluso and Watts 2001, Collins 2008). In contrast, small-scale fisheries represent a local CPR 'accumulation regime,' guided by catch sharing and local markets, integrally connected to the means of production, and sharing both profits and losses without insurance arrangements to protect them (Peluso and Watts 2001). This uneven distribution of tangible and intangible assets creates an uneven playing field wherein small-scale actors have fewer choices, increased vulnerability, and strong motivation to resolve incidents at sea (box 1: F, box 2: A–D). Meanwhile, industrial actors have more choices, less vulnerability, and an opposing incentive to avoid interaction and negotiation, as it would likely result in loss of property and time, and could result in harm to vessel or crew. In this way, the convergence of opposing political economies directly shapes the positions of actors, configuring their incentives and relative power (figure S1). While differences in action resources are not, in themselves, sufficient to explain incidences of conflict, their role in creating divergent incentives lends insight into the emergence of conflicts.

A second trend contributing to conflictual outcomes is the divergent sense of legitimacy and historical claim created by the disparate identities and values of industrial and small-scale actors. Past work on commons governance suggests user groups with shared identity, values, and history of cooperation are more likely to engage in effective resource management, whereas actors with substantial differences are more likely to conflict (Ostrom 1990, Baland and Platteau 1996, Agrawal 2001). Where multiple horizontal inequalities align, such as where differences in identities or values correlate with differences in assets or historical claim, risk of violence and conflict increases (Stewart et al 2008). This increased likelihood of conflict is rooted in the historical development of these identities, and conflict represents the process by which individuals and communities contest the allocation and distribution of resource benefits (Barbrow-Strain 2001, Peluso and Watts 2001, Turner et al 2003).

In Ghana, these differences profoundly affect the ways small-scale and industrial fishers perceive each other and interactions at sea. Small-scale fishers in Ghana have operated regionally for centuries and locally for millennia; the industrial fishery emerged in the 1950s and 1960s in response to development programs aimed at generating foreign currency (Adjetey 1973, Atta-Mills et al 2004, Overå 2011, Seto and Campbell 2020). While the small-scale fishery is almost exclusively Ghanaian, the industrial fishery is more varied; captains and first mates are oftentimes Chinese, Korean, or other nationalities (Nunoo et al 2014, O'Neill et al 2018), while crews are mixed and required by law to be at least 75% Ghanaian (Government of the Republic of Ghana 2002). These differences mean industrial actors have different cultures, languages, and values from small-scale fishers, complicating interactions and challenging communication (box 2: H and I). Small-scale fishers demonstrate strong group identity linked to place (Walker 2002, Atta-Mills et al 2004), whereas industrial fishers' are more closely tied to their vessel than their residence or sector as a whole (Walker 2002, Atta-Mills et al 2004) (Nunoo et al 2014). These dissimilarities contribute to conflicts, as small-scale fishers cite their Ghanaian nationality, identity as fishermen, and historical entitlement as support for their prevailing legitimacy and resource claims (box 2: J and K).

These disparate notions of legitimacy and historical claim are critical, as they reveal the ways in which fishing communities contest resource allocation. Small-scale fisheries are ancient, grassroots, based in nationalist, ethnic, and linguistic identities, and tied to fishers' communities. In contrast, industrial fisheries are a few decades old, government-initiated, largely operated by foreign interests for export market profit, and stationed in two large urban ports. These divergent histories give way to equally different senses of historical claim, perceived legitimacy, and resource rights (Bavinck 2005), reinforcing small-scale fishers' entitlement to fisheries resources, and strengthening their determination to pursue reparation at sea. While different identities are not sufficient to explain conflicts, they improve our understanding of the relationship between fishing sectors, between sectors and the resource, and the perceptions of benefit that guide conflictual outcomes.

The third trend contributing to patterns of conflict are the different sets of laws and norms guiding behavior of small-scale versus industrial fishers. Legal pluralism, where different legal mechanisms and institutions are applicable within a given situation (Vanderlinden 1972, Bavinck 2005, Tamanaha 2008), has been credited in some contexts with producing positive outcomes for cooperative resource management (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2002, Berman 2006, Ostrom 2010). However, in other cases, it has been linked to conflicts, where different actors abide by separate sets of rules and norms that make competing claims of authority or impose conflicting demands (Bavinck 2005, Jentoft et al 2009, Ratner et al 2013).

In Ghana, the different 'rules in use' that industrial and small-scale fishers appeal to within an interaction highlights this pathway to conflict. Small-scale fishers often draw upon national laws to demonstrate the illegality of activities conducted by industrial fishers and increase the legitimacy of their claims (box 2: L and M), most commonly citing the inshore exclusion zone (IEZ), an area reserved for small-scale fishing (Government of the Republic of Ghana 2002, Seto et al 2022), as well as laws prohibiting light fishing, pair trawling, and destruction of nets (Government of the Republic of Ghana 2002). Small-scale fishers also draw upon norms to rebuke industrial fishers for unethical practices, claim preeminent user rights, or engender compassion and commonality. Small-scale fishers sometimes appeal to a sense of kinship or commensuration, employing norms of reciprocity and shared identity to compel cooperation and compensation (box 2: N). Industrial fishers also refer to state laws, such as those regarding lighting and traffic zones, to bolster their position and assign blame to small-scale fishers (box 2: O). Industrial actors do not frequently draw upon ethical norms of behavior, but often appeal to international laws outlined in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) or the International Maritime Organization (IMO). For example, industrial actors cite laws about navigation, unsanctioned boarding of a vessel, and piracy to legitimize their actions and undermine the claims of small-scale fishers (UN General Assembly 1982, IMO 2009). For industrial actors, the 'rules in use' are primarily national and international laws, not local or cultural norms.

In addition to the 'rules in use,' different institutions dominate the two sectors. Likely the most influential institution governing Ghanaian small-scale fishers is the chief fisherman and the council of elders. The chief fisherman is an ancient institution, occurring in each fishing village along the Ghanaian coast (Walker 2002, Finegold et al 2010). Chief fishermen exert substantial power and influence over small-scale fishing activities, setting rules and taboos, determining access rights, and mediating disputes. In the industrial sector, individual fishing companies are the institutions with the most influence on vessel behavior, with some influence from industrial fishing associations. This multitude of laws and norms is critical in understanding conflict and cooperation, as it comprises the framework within which actors perceive and assert claims, convey power, and conceptualize the positions of others. These rules and institutions constitute different 'sea tenure systems' (Cordell 1989, Bavinck 2005), wherein not all actors are subject to every governance arrangement. For example, the chief fisherman is the most influential institution governing small-scale fisher behavior, but it is not recognized by the industrial sector. Similarly, small-scale fishers are often unaware of international laws and regulations that shape industrial fishing endeavors. Here the small-scale sea tenure system emphasizes commensuration and compels fishers to negotiate at sea, whereas the industrial system emphasizes vessel autonomy, obliging them to avoid negotiation and prevent boarding at great cost. These differences are a primary contributor toward pathways of conflict and violence.

While much research has focused on the triggers of resource conflict, one strength of the current framework is identifying the circumstances in which actors avert conflict, and cooperate. Where cooperation emerged, the ability for actors to create commonality between industrial and small-scale actors proved essential. Studies of social capital suggest that social bonds and norms are important for individual and community function, and by lowering the transactions costs of working together, social capital can facilitate cooperation (Pretty 2003). In this function, bridging social capital, or connections between groups that may have different or opposing views, is particularly key (Woolcock 2001, Pretty 2003).

The requirement that 75% of industrial crew be Ghanaian nationals results in a mixed industrial crew, and in some cases, Ghanaians on industrial vessels provided the bridging social capital needed for cooperative outcomes (Government of the Republic of Ghana 2002). These Ghanaians acted to: enhance communication and act as interpreters; refer small-scale fishers to land-based institutions like the vessel's fishing company, the Arbitration Committee, or the police station; communicate the industrial vessel's identity; express sympathy and warn small-scale fishers of potential threats or violence; and enable small-scale fishers' boarding, appease arguments, and suggest means of resolution (box 3: A–F). The Ghanaian crewmembers that bridge the gap between industrial and small-scale sectors' values and tenure systems represent 'change agents' able to influence others toward pathways of conflict or cooperation (Ratner et al 2013). Within incidents, both kinds of change agents are present, in some cases defusing what began as a conflictual interaction, and in others, escalating what had begun as cooperation (box 3: A and G). However, where cooperation did emerge, the role of Ghanaian industrial crewmembers was often pivotal.

This heterogeneity of the industrial crew—created through a specific regulation—complicates straightforward notions of sector differentiation and conflict. Peluso and Watts (2001) state that, 'There is no single theory of violence... It is important to ask, therefore, why violence occurs in some places and not in others, why some factors are more important than others, and why brutal acts define some conflicts and not others... to reveal how these causal forces articulate in specific circumstances.' Here, cases of cooperation demonstrate that conflict is not the inevitable consequence of certain triggers, but even where these triggers occur, conflict is a social process, and cooperative outcomes are possible.

Where shared 'rules in use,' in the form of laws and institutions, were known, they were also essential in guiding cooperative outcomes. Interactive and adaptive governance suggests that many conventional institutions are poorly suited for conflict management between groups with different or opposing characteristics (Folke 2006, Sanginga et al 2007, Jentoft et al 2009, Jentoft and Bavinck 2014). Customary approaches (e.g. chief fishermen) are often unable to operate across communities or scales (Cash et al 2006, Berkes 2006b), while legal and administrative mechanisms are frequently inaccessible to marginalized user groups (e.g. rural communities) or lack the subject matter expertise to solve conflicts (e.g. police; Sanginga et al 2007). Further, within conventional institutions, actors have unequal power, such as industrial actors entering arbitration through the chief fisherman or a small-scale fishers negotiating with industrial fishing companies (Adger et al 2005, Sanginga et al 2007). However, hybrid and cross-scale institutions can provide an alternative wherein both actors trust in the negotiation of outcomes (Folke 2006).

In Ghana, the Arbitration Committee, which is comprised of small-scale and industrial fisheries representatives as well as Ghanaian Fisheries officials, is an example of a cross-scale institution. The Arbitration Committee acts as a quasi-governmental institution through the Fisheries Commission, however it arbitrates incidents outside the official legal and judicial system within Ghana, providing a faster, cheaper, and more sector-appropriate venue for dispute resolution than the court system. In the incident narratives, where individuals knew of the Arbitration Committee (box 3: H), or were informed of it at sea (box 3: I), conflicts were avoided and cooperation emerged. In these cases, small-scale fishers could leverage this knowledge while at sea to improve their case on land, collecting proof and testimony for evidence at the Arbitration Committee. Evidence may include contact information, weapons, accounts of industrial actors or nearby observers, or other materials (box 3: J–L). Since limited government capacity constrains monitoring in sea space, access to land-based mechanisms of enforcement and accountability provided an essential secondary means of restitution.

The choice to engage in conflict or cooperation depends on each actor's calculus of anticipated benefit (Ramirez 1999). When small-scale fishers perceive interactions at sea as the only avenue to restitution, there is strong incentive to compel negotiation and compensation in sea space. However, knowledge of a competent cross-scale institution alters that 'calculus of anticipated benefit' by providing an alternative, land-based means of settlement and potential compensation. While in some cases, actors used their knowledge of the Arbitration Committee to engender cooperation (box 3: M), in others it was used more as a last resort, less prompting cooperation so much as avoiding conflict escalation and providing a channel for onshore restitution (box 3: N). Here, the presence of the Arbitration Committee also provides an exception to notions of a deterministic pathway to conflict, providing the circumstances to avert conflict and shape cooperation.